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HPR1000 is an advanced nuclear power plant (NPP) with the significant feature of an active and passive 
safety design philosophy, developed by the China National Nuclear Corporation. On one hand, it is an 
evolutionary design based on proven technology of the existing pressurized water reactor NPP; on the 
other hand, it incorporates advanced design features including a 177-fuel-assembly core loaded with 
CF3 fuel assemblies, active and passive safety systems, comprehensive severe accident prevention and 
mitigation measures, enhanced protection against external events, and improved emergency response 
capability. Extensive verification experiments and tests have been performed for critical innovative 
improvements on passive systems, the reactor core, and the main equipment. The design of HPR1000 
fulfills the international utility requirements for advanced light water reactors and the latest nuclear 
safety requirements, and addresses the safety issues relevant to the Fukushima accident. Along with 
its outstanding safety and economy, HPR1000 provides an excellent and practicable solution for both 
domestic and international nuclear power markets. 
© 2016 THE AUTHORS. Published by Elsevier LTD on behalf of Chinese Academy of Engineering and 
Higher Education Press Limited Company. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND 
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1.  Introduction
The use of nuclear energy for electricity generation began in 
the late 1950s and went through several phases over the sub-
sequent half century [1,2]. Today, nuclear energy contributes 
11% of the world’s electricity, with over 435 power reactors in 
31 countries [3,4]. The designs of nuclear power plants (NPPs) 
are categorized by “generation.” After the prototype reactors 
of Generation-I and the commercial reactors of Generation-II, 
Generation-III light water reactors (LWRs) incorporate state-of-
the-art improvements in the areas of fuel technology, thermal 
efficiency, and safety systems [5,6]. The most-widely-accepted 
criteria for Generation-III LWRs are contained in two documents: 
the Advanced Light Water Reactor Utility Requirements Document 
(URD) [7] issued by the US Electric Power Research Institute 
(EPRI), and the European Utility Requirements for LWR Nuclear 
Power Plants (EUR) [8] issued by a cooperative organization 
of European utilities. URD and EUR provide comprehensive 
requirements for Generation-III NPPs (or advanced NPPs), 
including requirements for safety design, performance design, 
and economic competitiveness. The first batch of Generation-III 
NPPs, such as AP1000 and European pressurized reactor (EPR), 
has been deployed since the beginning of the 21st century and 
will shortly be connected to the grid†.
The Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident that occurred on March 
11, 2011 drew worldwide attention onto the safety of NPPs. The 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), governments, and 
nuclear safety authorities all issued special reports on the lessons 
learned from the Fukushima accident (e.g., Refs. [9–12]). These 
reports focused on areas such as protection against external 
events, the robustness of emergency power and ultimate heat 
sinks, the safety of the spent fuel pool, the emergency responses 
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for multiple-unit accidents, and the inhabitability and availability 
of emergency facilities [13]. Safety inspections, or stress tests, and 
necessary improvements were made for current NPPs based on 
the Fukushima feedback (e.g., Refs. [14–16]). In addition, safety 
requirements for new NPPs were also considered and discussed, 
as reflected in documents such as Safety of New NPP Designs [17] 
drafted by the Western European Nuclear Regulator’s Association 
(WENRA), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (No. SSR-2/1, 
Rev.1) [18] drafted by the IAEA, and Safety Requirements for New 
NPPs during 12th Five-Year Plan [19] drafted by the China National 
Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA). The improved safety 
requirements for new NPPs in the above documents generally 
cover the following aspects: a revised and strengthened defense-
in-depth approach, response capability for beyond-design-
basis accidents (BDBAs) including multiple failures, the practical 
elimination of large radioactivity release to mitigate off-site 
emergency, and protection against internal and external hazards. 
In addition, concepts such as residual risk and a plant autonomy 
period were brought into discussion in the international nuclear 
power industry.
The technology of advanced NPPs has been mainstreamed and 
nuclear safety standards for new NPPs in the post-Fukushima era 
will be stricter. With this situation as a background, the China 
National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) developed the evolutionary 
advanced pressurized water reactor (PWR) HPR1000. The design 
makes full use of proven technology from the design, construc-
tion, and operation experience of the large PWR fleet in China, 
and introduces a number of advanced design features to meet 
the latest safety requirements and address the feedback from the 
Fukushima accident. 
The CNNC has been dedicated to developing advanced PWRs 
for the past two decades, with an R&D program going through 
three phases, which are respectively represented by three suc-
cessively developed models known as CNP1000, CP1000, and 
HPR1000. The development of CNP1000 occurred in 1999, and 
CP1000 has incorporated 22 major improvements based on 
CNP1000 since 2007. The concept of HPR1000 was proposed as 
the final solution for the Generation-III PWR, with a key technolo-
gy research program launched in January 2010. After the Fukushi-
ma accident, the program gathered pace with the complementary 
research prompted by the Fukushima feedback. 
In April 2013, the basic design of HPR1000 was reviewed by an 
expert group organized by the China Nuclear Energy Association 
(CNEA). The first deployment of HPR1000 is at the units 5 and 6 
of Fuqing NPP, located in Fujian Province. Construction started on 
May 7, 2015 after the preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) 
was reviewed and a construction license was granted by the 
NNSA.
2.  Design philosophy
The fundamental safety functions to be ensured for nuclear 
power reactors are: control of the reactivity, removal of heat from 
the core and the spent fuel, and confinement of radioactive ma-
terials and control of operational discharges, as well as limitation 
of accidental releases. In order to achieve these safety functions 
for HPR1000, a defense-in-depth concept is performed through-
out all safety-related activities to ensure that they are subject to 
overlapping provisions. Structures, systems, and components im-
portant to safety will be capable of withstanding identified initi-
ating events with sufficient robustness; this is ensured by design 
criteria such as redundancy, diversity, and independence. Active 
and passive safety design is the most remarkable innovation for 
HPR1000 and is also a typical example of fulfilling the diversity 
criteria. The design does not only inherit mature and reliable 
active technologies, but also introduces passive systems as the 
backup for the active systems in case of a loss of alternate current 
(AC) power. Both active and passive features are employed to 
guarantee the safety functions of emergency core cooling, residu-
al heat removal, in-vessel retention (IVR) of the molten core, and 
containment heat removal (Fig. 1). It is worth pointing out that 
the application of the passive systems does not provide an excuse 
for reducing the design requirements of the active systems. The 
availability of the active system must first be ensured, with the 
passive system as a backup provision. 
Due to the inherent safety features of NPPs, an initial deviation 
will cause no significant safety-related effect or bring the plant 
toward a safe condition. Here are a few typical instances: The 
reactor core is designed with negative reactivity coefficient 
feedbacks; the control rods are inserted into the reactor by 
gravity in case of a power cut-off; and natural circulation can 
be established in the reactor coolant system (RCS) as long as the 
integrity of the RCS is maintained and heat is removed by the sec-
ondary side of steam generators (SGs).
The target of practically eliminating large radioactivity release 
has drawn extensive discussion after the Fukushima accident. In 
order to control large release frequency (LRF) to below 10–7 per 
reactor-year, the design of HPR1000 emphasizes the integrity of 
the containment by adopting comprehensive severe accident pre-
vention and mitigation measures against possible severe accident 
sequences identified by probabilistic methods and deterministic 
methods. 
In order to further eliminate the residual risk, the design 
includes appropriate measures and adequate margins to protect 
the plant from beyond-design-basis external events such as 
earthquakes, flooding, and large commercial aircraft crashes. The 
emergency response capability is enhanced by providing mobile 
pumps and mobile diesel generators. The passive systems are able 
to operate for 72 h with a sufficient inventory of storage water 
and dedicated batteries, which significantly extends the plant 
autonomy period. As HPR1000 is a new model available after the 
Fukushima accident, its designers have learned from the accident 
and taken provisions to ensure the plant’s survival under a similar 
scenario.
The operational performance and economic goals of HPR1000 
Fig. 1.  Active and passive systems of HPR1000. Red line—active systems; green 
line—passive systems; IRWST—in-containment refueling water storage tank.
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are in line with the requirements in URD and EUR, such as plant 
availability, design lifetime, and refueling cycle. Most of the 
plant’s equipment is proven and can be manufactured in China, 
providing more economic benefits and convenient equipment 
supply chains. The application of advanced features, such as leak-
before-break (LBB) technology and an integrated reactor pressure 
vessel head structure, also reduce the cost and time required for 
both construction and maintenance. 
The development of  HPR1000 is based on self-reliant 
innovations, resulting in the possession of an independent in-
tellectual property right. For example, the core is designed to 
load with 177 advanced fuel assemblies of CF3—a remarkable 
accomplishment, developed through years of CNNC research 
programs. The CNNC also developed innovative design software 
in nuclear design, thermo-hydraulic design and accident analysis, 
equipment and system design, and so on.
3.  Technical features
Table 1 presents the general parameters of HPR1000, and 
this section briefly introduces its major technical features: the 
reactor core and fuel, RCS, engineering safety features, severe 
accident prevention and mitigation measures, and buildings and 
structures.
3.1.  Reactor core and fuel
The HPR1000 reactor core generates 3050 MWth of thermal 
power with an average linear power density of 173.8 W·cm–1. The 
reactor core is loaded with 177 fuel assemblies, ensuring suffi-
cient thermal margin while increasing output power. The core 
design permits a refueling cycle of 18 months by low-leakage 
loading patterns, with the flexibility of extending the refueling 
cycle. The CF3 fuel assembly is composed of 264 fuel rods ar-
ranged within a 17 × 17 supporting structure. The fuel rods 
contain UO2 pellets or Gd2O3-UO2 pellets. Combined with an inno-
vative advanced zircaloy cladding material and the designs of the 
grid, nozzle, and guide tube, CF3 has an excellent performance 
and is applicable for a long refueling cycle.
Three independent means exist for core reactivity and power 
distribution control: burnable absorber of gadolinium (Gd2O3) 
poisons, rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs), and soluble bo-
ron absorber. The RCCA is comprised of 24 control rods fastened 
to a spider connector. The absorber material used in the control 
rod is Ag-In-Cd alloy or stainless steel. HPR1000 is designed with 
a thermal margin greater than 15% to improve safety and opera-
tional performance.
3.2.  Reactor coolant system (RCS)
The RCS of HPR1000 is a mature three-loop design, which 
has gathered abundant operating experience around the world. 
Three loops connect in parallel to the reactor pressure vessel 
(RPV), each containing an SG and a reactor coolant pump (Fig. 2). 
An electrically heated pressurizer is connected to one of the re-
actor coolant loops. The sizes of the RPV, SGs, and pressurizer 
have been increased in order to accommodate larger power and 
provide greater tolerance for transients, reducing the potential 
of an unplanned reactor trip. The increased volumes of the SG 
secondary side also contribute to the grace time to mitigate 
steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) accident prior to flooding 
the secondary sides of the SG, and extend the time to dryout for 
the accident of total loss of feedwater.
The design lifetime of the RPV is extended to 60 years by 
controlling the content of noxious elements in the material, 
reducing the initial reference temperature for nil ductility tran-
sition (RTNDT) of both the base metal and the welding material, 
eliminating the weld in the core shell, and providing a large water 
gap. The RPV is made of low-alloy steel, with the internal surface 
covered by stainless steel cladding for corrosion resistance. The 
major parts of the RPV are machined from single-piece forgings 
to reduce the number of welds. The use of advanced in-core 
instrumentation cancels the penetration through the lower head 
of the RPV.
The ZH-65 type SG is used for HPR1000, which is a vertical, 
inverted U-tube SG with natural circulation in the secondary 
side and an integral moisture separation device. The tubes are 
made of Inconel 690 alloy with excellent corrosion resistance, 
and supported by tube support plate (TSP), in which the holes are 
arranged in trefoil geometry. The parts in contact with the reactor 
coolant are either made of corrosion resistant alloys, or are clad 
with austenitic stainless steel or Inconel alloy.
The pressurizer has a total free volume of 51 m3, to limit 
pressure variations during load transients and maintain RCS 
pressure within design limits. Overpressure protection is provided 
by three series of pilot-operated safety valves. Dedicated valves 
are designed for depressurizing the RCS upon the occurrence 
of severe accident. The RCS inventory is discharged through the 
valves to the relief tank.
The reactor coolant pump in each loop is a vertical, single- 
Table 1
General parameters of HPR1000.
Parameter Value
Reactor thermal output 3050 MWth
Power plant output, gross ~1170 MWe
Power plant output, net ~1090 MWe
Power plant efficiency, net ~36%
Mode of operation Baseload and load follow
Plant design life 60 years
Plant availability target ≥ 90%
Refueling cycle 18 months
Safety shutdown earthquake (SSE) 0.3g (g, gravitation constant)
Core damage frequency (CDF) < 10–6 per reactor-year
Large release frequency (LRF) < 10–7 per reactor-year
Occupational radiation exposure < 0.6 person-Sv per reactor-year
Operator non-intervention period 0.5 h
Plant autonomy period 72 h Fig. 2.  The reactor coolant system (RCS) of three loops.
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stage, shaft-sealed centrifugal pump, driven by an air-cooled, 
three-phase induction motor. The pump is installed with a stand-
still seal that is capable of maintaining leak-tightness of the pump 
shaft without requiring an active seal water injection system in 
case of pump trip.
The reactor coolant piping is integrally forged and designed 
according to the LBB concept. It eliminates the need to design the 
RCS components, piping, and supports used to accommodate the 
dynamic effects of large or double-ended ruptures.
3.3.  Engineering safety features
The engineering safety features are adopted to mitigate 
design-basis accidents (DBAs), and include a safety injection 
system, auxiliary feedwater system, and containment spray 
system (Fig. 3). The engineering safety features are comprised of 
redundant trains to fulfill single failure criteria. Independence is 
ensured by arranging each train in a physically separate building 
and supplying power by each of the emergency diesel generators.
The safety injection system consists of two active subsystems—
the middle head safety injection (MHSI) subsystem and low head 
safety injection (LHSI) subsystem—and one passive subsystem—
the accumulator injection subsystem. An in-containment 
refueling water storage tank (IRWST) is adopted as the water 
source of the injections, which provides protection against 
external events and makes it unnecessary to switch water sources 
during long-term injection phase, as compared with other NPP 
designs placing the refueling water tank outside the containment. 
The MHSI and LHSI pumps suck water from the IRWST after a 
loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), and inject the borated water 
to the RCS for emergency core cooling in order to prevent core 
damage. The improvements in the configurations compared to 
existing NPPs include: ① The safety injection pumps are not 
shared with other systems in order to improve the equipment re-
liability and independence; ② the injection head is lowered to re-
duce the risk of SGTR, and ③ the boron injection tank and boron 
recirculation loop are cancelled to achieve system simplification.
The auxiliary feedwater system supplies emergency feedwater 
to the secondary side of the SG to remove core decay heat in the 
case of a loss of normal feedwater. The feedwater is provided 
from two auxiliary feedwater pools with 2 × 50% motor-driven 
pumps (motors can be driven by the emergency diesel generators) 
and with 2 × 50% turbine-driven pumps (turbines are driven by 
steam produced in the SGs). The diversity of the pumps improves 
the robustness of the system.
The containment spray system is used to maintain the 
integrity of the containment by limiting containment pressure 
and temperature within the design limits, by spraying and 
cooling the steam released into the containment during LOCAs or 
main steam line break (MSLB) accidents. The spray water is taken 
from the IRWST by a containment spray pump, with chemical 
additive to reduce airborne fission products (especially iodine) 
and limit the corrosion of structural material. The LHSI pump can 
be used as a backup for the containment spray pump to ensure 
the reliability of long-term spray.
3.4.  Severe accident prevention and mitigation measures
Comprehensive prevention and mitigation measures have 
been incorporated in the HPR1000 design against possible threats 
of severe accidents (Fig. 4), including high-pressure molten cori-
um ejection, hydrogen detonation, basement melt-through, and 
long-term containment overpressure. The design also takes into 
account appropriate measures for specific BDBAs that are consid-
ered to be weak points of existing NPPs, such as station blackout 
(SBO).
The fast depressurization system of the RCS is used to 
depressurize the RCS rapidly during severe accidents in order to 
prevent the high-pressure molten corium ejection, which would 
cause direct containment heating. The system consists of two 
redundant parallel discharge lines connected to a nozzle on the 
pressurizer dome. Each line is installed with a gate valve and a 
globe valve in series.
The RPV high-point venting system is designed to remove non-
condensable gases from the RPV head during accident conditions, 
so as to avoid adverse impact to the heat transfer of the reactor 
core caused by the non-condensable gases. 
The cavity injection and cooling system (CIS) is used to cool 
the external surface of the RPV lower head by injecting water into 
the space between the RPV wall and the insulation layer, so as to 
maintain its integrity and realize the IVR of melt core debris. The 
CIS consists of an active subsystem and a passive subsystem. The 
active subsystem includes two parallel injection lines, each taking 
up water from the IRWST through a pump or from the fire water 
as a backup supply. The passive subsystem depends on a high-
point tank located in the containment. In the case of a severe 
accident and the failure of the active subsystem, the isolation 
valves can be opened and the water in the tank will flow down 
under gravity to cool the lower head of the RPV. 
The passive residual heat removal system of secondary side 
Fig. 3.  Engineering safety features. MHSI—middle head safety injection; LHSI—
low head safety injection.
Fig. 4.  Beyond-design-basis accident (BDBA)/severe accident prevention and mit-
igation measures.
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(PRS) is put into action in the event of an SBO and the failure 
of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, in order to 
provide feedwater to the secondary side of the SG in a passive 
way. The PRS consists of three trains connected to the three SGs, 
respectively. Natural circulation will be established in the closed 
loop between the secondary side of an SG and the heat exchanger 
submerged in the heat exchange tank on the upper part of the 
outer containment. The tank inventory can sustain the operation 
of the PRS for 72 h.
The containment hydrogen combination system is intended 
to decrease hydrogen concentration within the containment 
atmosphere to safe limits, in order to prevent hydrogen 
inflammation during DBAs or hydrogen detonation during severe 
accidents. The system is comprised of 33 passive autocatalytic 
recombiners installed inside the containment, which will be 
triggered automatically when the hydrogen concentration reaches 
the threshold.
The passive containment heat removal system (PCS) is 
designed to remove the heat in the containment, in order to 
ensure that the containment pressure and temperature will not 
exceed the design limits during BDBAs. The heat of the high-
temperature mixture of steam and gas inside the containment 
will be removed by water (or water-steam) flowing in the 
tubes of heat exchangers installed at a high position on the 
internal surface of the containment, to the heat exchange tank 
outside the containment. The temperature difference between 
the atmosphere of the containment and the water in the heat 
exchange tank, and the elevation difference between the tank 
and the heat exchangers, are the driving forces enabling natural 
circulation to remove the containment heat. The water in heat 
exchange tank is heated and evaporated after the saturated 
temperature is reached, and the heat finally dissipates to the 
environment. The tank inventory fulfils the requirement of a 72-
hour passive heat removal from the containment after severe 
accidents. 
The containment filtration and venting system is an option 
to prevent the pressure of the containment from exceeding its 
bearing capability by proactive and planned venting. The filtration 
equipment in the venting line is used to reduce the release of 
radioactivity to environment as much as possible.
To prevent the events of anticipated transient without scram 
(ATWS), the emergency boron injection system is designed to 
provide rapid boration to the RCS to bring the reactor core to sub-
critical state. If the normal boration system is not available, the 
emergency boron injection system is actuated manually to inject 
sufficient borated water to the RCS.
As mentioned earlier, the introduction of the passive systems 
is not an excuse to reduce the availability requirement for the 
active systems. HPR1000 still provides diverse and reliable 
power sources to ensure the safety of the plant under most 
circumstances. Under normal conditions, two independent off-
site electric power supplies are used as the main power and the 
auxiliary power, respectively. In the case of a failure of off-site 
power, two diesel generators (equipped for each reactor) and one 
additional diesel generator (equipped for all the reactors within a 
plant) will be put into action as on-site emergency power. During 
SBO accidents, two SBO diesel generators can be relied on to bring 
the plant into a safe shutdown state. Even when all of the above 
power sources are lost, mobile diesel generators can be used for 
temporary power. In addition to the AC power supplies, HPR1000 
has battery banks of different voltages to supply direct current 
(DC) power, including two independent 72-hour battery banks 
dedicated to the valves, instrumentation, and control load related 
to passive systems. 
3.5.  Buildings and structures
The general arrangement of HPR1000 is based on the single-
unit layout, which can be divided into a nuclear island (NI), a 
conventional island (CI) and the balance of plant (BOP). The reac-
tor building is located in the center of the NI, surrounded by the 
fuel building, the electrical building and two safeguard buildings. 
Other buildings are located on the periphery, such as the nuclear 
auxiliary building, access building, and so forth (Fig. 5).
Each of the redundant trains of engineering safety features is 
arranged in a different safeguard building, and the two safeguard 
buildings are placed on opposite sides of the reactor building to 
achieve complete physical separation. This setup minimizes the 
potential of common cause failures that are induced by external 
events. The two emergency diesel generator buildings are also 
physically separated, for the same reason.
The NI buildings are designed with a seismic input of peak 
ground acceleration of 0.3g (g, gravitation constant) for both 
horizontal and vertical directions. Seismic capacity is improved 
by an integral foundation raft built to support the reactor build-
ing, fuel building, electrical building, and safeguard buildings. 
A seismic margin assessment is also carried out to evaluate the 
plant’s resistance to a beyond-design-basis earthquake. 
Protection against a large commercial aircraft crash is achieved 
by concrete shielding shells for the reactor building, fuel building, 
and electrical building, and by complete physical separation for 
the safeguard buildings. The structures, systems, and components 
Fig. 5.  Nuclear island (NI) general layout. NB—reactor building; NF—fuel building; ND/NE—electrical building; NL—safeguard building A; NR—safeguard building B; NX—
nuclear auxiliary building; NN—connection building; NU—emergency diesel generator building A; NV—emergency diesel generator building B; NA—access building; NC—
emergency compressor house; NG—reactor building gantry; NP—fire protection pump station for NI; NH—SBO diesel generator building.
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that are important to safety are arranged so as to decrease the 
consequences of fires and explosions caused by external and 
internal events. All external natural events including earthquake, 
flooding, wind, tornado, tsunami, and site-related external 
human-caused events have been considered in the NI design. The 
possibilities of internal hazards such as internal flooding, missiles, 
pipe whipping, jetting, or fluid release have also been studied, 
and necessary provisions are incorporated in the NI design.
The plant arrangement separates the radioactive and non-
radioactive equipment and provides separate pathways to these 
areas for personnel access. Moreover, this arrangement improves 
the convenience and efficiency of inspection, maintenance, 
and component replacement, with the purpose of minimizing 
radiation exposure.
The HPR1000 reactor containment is a double-wall structure 
located on a common raft. The inner containment is a pre-
stressed reinforced concrete structure (including a cylindrical 
wall and a hemisphere dome) with a leak-tight steel liner, 
which is designed to withstand accident conditions (e.g., LOCAs) 
inside the containment and retain radioactive fission products. 
A sufficient margin is provided due to the large free volume 
(~87 000 m3) of the inner containment. For the leak-tightness 
requirement for the inner containment, the leak rate is less than 
0.3% of the gas contained in the free volume per 24 h under 
DBAs. The outer containment is a reinforced concrete structure 
(including a cylindrical wall and a shallow spherical dome) that 
is designed to withstand external events, such as aircraft crashes, 
external explosions, and missiles, in order to protect the inner 
containment and the internal structures and equipment. The 
outer containment also serves as part of the water tank structure 
for passive cooling systems. The three heat exchange tanks are 
located at the same elevation on the outside surface and form a 
ring structure that is supported by the outer containment. The 
annular space between the two containment walls is maintained 
with a slightly negative pressure by a ventilation system, in order 
to collect possible leakage from the inner containment and filter 
it before discharging it to environment.
4.  Experimental verification
As an evolutionary design of advanced PWR, HPR1000 is based 
on the proven technologies. The new advanced features have been 
successfully evaluated and verified by experiments to ensure 
that they enhance safety and operational performance. The 
experimental activities carried out over several years by the CNNC 
include the following critical tests related to the elaborations 
of passive systems, reactor core and main equipment: CIS 
verification test, PRS verification test, PCS verification test, reactor 
hydraulic integral test, reactor bypass flow tests, control rod 
driven line (CRDL) seismic test, reactor lower plenum mixing test, 
flow-induced vibration tests, and SG design verification tests.
In the CIS verification test, the critical heat flux (CHF) of 
boiling on the RPV external surface for both the active and passive 
flow subsystems was measured to demonstrate the cooling 
capability of the CIS. The test section was half a slice of the 
hemispheric lower head of the RPV with an appropriate scaling 
ratio (Fig. 6). Twelve heater blocks were installed that each 
covered a 7.5° angular area. During the experiment, the heating 
power was increased gradually until boiling crisis occurred. The 
temperatures of the external surface of the test section were 
monitored continuously by thermocouples, and the boiling crisis 
was recognized by a sudden rise of the thermocouple signal. The 
test provided the bounding heat removal capacity (i.e., CHF) as 
a function of angular position, for both active and passive flow 
subsystems. The external cooling capability characterized by the 
CHF was therefore obtained and the effectiveness of the CIS for 
IVR was proved.
The PRS validation test was carried out to validate the heat 
removal capacity and design parameters of the PRS, and to test 
the natural circulation stability and the long-term (72 h) operat-
ing capability. The PRS test facility, called ESPRIT (Fig. 7), had full 
pressure and height, and the 1/62.5 volume of the prototype. The 
circulation loop of ESPRIT was comprised of a steam-water circu-
lation loop (including a simulated SG, heat exchanger, and make-
up tank), a cooling pool outside the containment and the heat 
removal system, a steam discharging system, and other auxiliary 
systems. The water in the cooling pool was heated by the heat 
exchanger, resulting in natural circulation in the pool, and finally, 
heat was dissipated to the environment by evaporation. The sta-
ble operational capability of the PRS was tested under conditions 
of different pressure and power. Moreover, the transient perfor-
mance of the PRS was studied in an SBO accident scenario. The 
test proved the capability of the PRS to remove the decay heat 
after an SBO accident for 72 h, regardless of the availability of the 
turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
In order to support the PCS design and verify the performance 
of the system and of key equipment, extensive experimental 
studies were performed on a single-tube test facility and a 
comprehensive performance test facility, respectively. In the 
Fig. 6.  Cavity injection and cooling system (CIS) test facility.
Fig. 7.  Passive residual heat removal system of secondary side (PRS) test facility.
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single-tube test, heat transfer mechanism in a single tube 
was investigated in order to provide an accurate and reliable 
basis for the design of the heat exchanger. The comprehensive 
performance test was accomplished on the full-pressure and full-
height facility (Fig. 8) to verify the heat removal capability and 
operational performance of the PCS under different accidental 
conditions, containment atmospheres, and water levels in the 
heat exchange tank. The performance of key equipment was also 
tested. Conclusions drawn from the test included: ① The heat 
removal capability of the PCS can be ensured, regardless of stages 
(early or long term) of an accident; ② the heat removal power of 
the PCS decreases from start-up to normal operations, and the 
pressure and temperature fluctuations are too small to threaten 
system safety; and ③ the performance of the developed internal 
heat exchanger, separator, and steam discharge device meet the 
design requirements.
The objective of the reactor hydraulic integral test was to 
obtain the flow distribution at the inlet of the reactor core and 
the resistance factor of the reactor parts, in order to validate the 
reactor thermal-hydraulic design. The diameter of the test facility 
was scaled to be one fourth of the prototypic value (Fig. 9), and 
the simulant fuel assembly had the same hydraulic characteristics 
and axial and radial flow resistance as the prototype. The test 
demonstrated the following: ① The flow distribution in the core 
is fairly uniform, with the normalized flow distribution factors in 
the range of 0.95 to 1.07; ② the flow in the central area is larger 
than in the outer area, which is consistent with the core power 
distribution of the low-leakage fuel management strategy, and 
benefits the heat removal of the fuel assemblies; and ③ the pres-
sure drops measured for the reactor parts provide insights for the 
design of the reactor and of the reactor coolant pumps.
The reactor bypass flow tests includes the testing for the 
control rod guide tube bypass flow, the RPV upper head bypass 
flow, the bypass flow between the core baffle and barrel, and the 
outlet nozzle leakage flow test, with the purpose of studying the 
relations between bypass flows and the geometry, arrangement, 
or hydraulic characteristics of different internals of the RPV. The 
test models were designed for each of the above tests with a 
rational scale ratio to the prototype. The tests showed that the 
total bypass flow fraction measured is less than the design limit 
of 6.5%, which is used for the reactor thermal-hydraulic design.
The CRDL is the channel for lifting, inserting, and dropping 
of the RCCA, and its seismic capability is important to reactor 
safety. The test facility included the CRDL, a multiple point shock 
device, and the supporting bracket. In the seismic test, the CRDL 
performance, falling rod function, and structure integrity during 
and after an earthquake were investigated. The test proved that 
the CRDL meets the design requirement of resisting an input 
seismic load of 0.3g.
The reactor lower plenum mixing test was performed to 
obtain the lower plenum mixing factors under various conditions, 
which are used to determine the ratio of the boron water to the 
cold water injected during accidents. The test facility consisted 
of a reactor model, three-loop system, and measurement system. 
The reactor model was the same as that used in the reactor 
hydraulic integral test. Two of the loops can be injected with 
potassium chloride (KCl) solution. The test provided the average 
mixing factor of the lower plenum and the average value of the 
maximum mixing factors in the 120° area for each of the loops 
injected with KCl solution.
The flow-induced vibration tests were intended to obtain 
the natural vibration characteristics and flow-induced vibration 
response of the reactor vessel internals (RVIs), in order to verify 
the structural design of the RVI. The tests included a natural 
vibration characteristics test in air and still water, and a flow-
induced vibration response test. The test model, with a scale 
ratio of 1:5, was adopted based on the fluid-structure interaction 
similarity principle, and the test conditions covered almost 
all predictable conditions. The test showed that flow-induced 
vibration of the RVI is small, stable, and random. As the stress 
caused by flow-induced vibration is much lower than the fatigue 
stress limit, it is expected that high-cycle fatigue damage will 
not occur during the lifetime. In the durability test where the 
RVI were subject to a continuous 50-hour operation with the 
rated flow, no loosing or falling-off was discovered in the parts 
and their connections. The function of the hold down spring 
remained, and no abrasions or scratches appeared on the core 
barrel flange.
The SG design verification tests can be divided into the TSP 
hydraulic test, the moisture separation device test, and the flow-
induced vibration test of the SG heat transfer tube bundle. The 
purpose of the TSP hydraulic test was to verify the TSP hydraulic 
characteristics by measuring the pressure drop when fluid flowed 
through the TSP at different steam pressures, temperatures, and 
mass flow rates. The moisture separation device of the ZH-65 
type SG consists of a primary separator and a secondary dryer. 
The test investigated the draining capacity of the dryer, and 
the flow resistance and water-steam separation capacity of the 
separator and the dryer under hot conditions. Moreover, the 
dynamic characteristics of the tube under impact were measured, 
Fig. 8.  Passive containment heat removal system (PCS) comprehensive perfor-
mance test facility.
Fig. 9.  Reactor hydraulic integral test facility.
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and the flow-induced vibration response of the tube bundle of the 
SG was tested with a simulated flow under full power operating 
conditions.
5.  Conclusions
As a Generation-III PWR design developed by the CNNC, 
HPR1000 fulfills the international utility requirements for ad-
vanced LWRs, and the increasingly stringent nuclear regulations 
and safety standards. It has also taken into account the feedback 
from the Fukushima accident. A number of advanced design fea-
tures have been incorporated into the design, including a 177-fuel- 
assembly core loaded with CF3 fuel assemblies, an active and 
passive safety design philosophy, comprehensive severe accident 
prevention and mitigation measures, enhanced protection against 
external events, and improved emergency response capability. 
Large-scale test facilities were conceived, on which tests were 
performed to demonstrate that the new design features are capa-
ble of achieving design targets and functions, without any adverse 
impact on plant safety. The safety issues which have drawn ex-
tensive attentions and discussions after the Fukushima accident, 
such as practically eliminating the large radioactivity release, 
reducing the residual risk, and extending the plant autonomy pe-
riod, have also been addressed with appropriate improvements. 
Compared to most existing PWR NPPs in China, the HPR1000 
plant has achieved a vast improvement or even a breakthrough 
in safety goals, with the two important probabilistic safety indi-
cators CDF and LRF reduced by almost two orders of magnitude. 
HPR1000 satisfies the safety criteria for new NPPs set by the 
Chinese government after the Fukushima accident. In compari-
son with other Generation-III NPPs around the world, HPR1000 
generally provides equivalent safety and performance; however, 
it includes additional substantial innovations in the diversity of 
safety features, which significantly improve the robustness of 
necessary safety functions under all circumstances. In addition, 
the economic competitiveness, constructability, operability, and 
maintainability of HPR1000 can be ensured because it compre-
hensively utilizes both proven technology and equipment, and 
the mature equipment supply chain in China. 
Its excellent safety and performance design, and its economic 
competitiveness, make HPR1000 a perfect choice for new NPPs 
in both domestic and international markets. Notably, after the 
design were reviewed and approved by the respective nuclear 
safety authorities, the domestic and international demonstration 
projects of HPR1000 started construction in May and August of 
2015, respectively. The future deployments of HPR1000 will not 
only contribute to the Chinese mid- and long-term nuclear power 
development plans, but also meet the clean energy needs of the 
international market.
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Nomenclature
AC alternate current
ATWS anticipated transient without scram
BDBA beyond-design-basis accident
BOP balance of plant
CDF core damage frequency
CHF critical heat flux
CI conventional island
CIS cavity injection and cooling system
CNEA China Nuclear Energy Association
CNNC China National Nuclear Corporation
CRDL control rod driven line
DBA design-basis accident
DC  direct current
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
EUR European Utility Requirements for LWR Nuclear Power 
Plants
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IRWST in-containment refueling water storage tank
IVR in-vessel retention
LBB leak-before-break
LHSI low head safety injection
LOCA loss-of-coolant accident
LRF large release frequency
LWR light water reactor
MHSI middle head safety injection
MSLB main steam line break
NI nuclear island
NNSA National Nuclear Safety Administration
NPP nuclear power plant
PCS passive containment heat removal system
PRS passive residual heat removal system of secondary side
PSAR preliminary safety analysis report
PWR pressurized water reactor
RCCA rod cluster control assembly
RCS reactor coolant system
RPV reactor pressure vessel
RVI reactor vessel internal
SBO station blackout
SG steam generator
SGTR steam generator tube rupture
SSE safety shutdown earthquake
TSP tube support plate
URD Advanced Light Water Reactor Utility Requirement Doc-
ument
WENRA Western European Nuclear Regulator’s Association
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